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The return of Japanese evacuees from wartime relocation centers to the
West Coast' has brought the alien land laws of the Pacific Coast states- once
more before the courts. The states, inspired by war strengthened anti-Jap-
anese sentiment, have undertaken a revitalized campaign to enforce the pro-
hibitions against the holding of agricultural land by aliens ineligible for
citizenship-which, in effect, means the Japanese.3  On the other hand, the
opposition to legislative discrimination moves with a tread increasingly con-
fident. The federal courts have shown a mounting reluctance to swallow preju-
dice preserved in precedent.4 Moreover, the United Nations charter, which
promises universal respect for human rights and freedoms regardless of
race, sex, language, or religion,3 suggests new lines of attack on anti-minority
legislation hitherto deemed constitutional.
1. For an excellent and exhaustive treatment of the wartime relocation of Japanese-
Americans, see the series of publications by the War Relocation Authority, published in
1946 under the following titles: AwaiNXSTRATIWV HIGHLIGHTS OF THE VRA PpocnAn;
ComuNrry GovEREN-T N N VAR RELocATION CENTas; THE EVACUATa PEOPLE: A
QUAN-ITATIVE DEscRIPTION; IMPOUNDED PEOPLE: JAPANESE AmmcA.xs INz THE RLOCA-
TION CENTRns; LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHASES OF THE WVRA Pnocmm: THE REw-
CATION PROGRAaI; TOKEN SHne.mENT: THE STORY OF AmmmIc&'s WAn REFUGEE SHELTER;
VARTUnE ExILE: THE ExcmUsIoN OF THE JAPANEsE-AERIA .AS Fno, THE WEST
COAST; TnE VARTm HANDLING OF EVACUEE PRoPERY. See also Rostowv, The Japancse-
American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945) ; Alexandre and Freeman, War-
time Control of Japanese-Americans, 28 CoRN. L. Q. 385 (1943). On the return of the
evacuees see V.R RELoCATION AUrHORrr, Srmi-ANuAL RErorrr: JULY 1 -To DEC. 31,
1945 (1946); VAR REoCATrO.N; AUTHORITY, Tonrm. SHaMsrr: THe STo Y oF A2rMx-
ca's WAR REFUGEE SHELTt, 75-104 (1946); Lane, Japanese Rescllmecnt, 4 Put. NEL-
FA 127 (1946); Myer, VRA Says Thirty, 112 Nun REi'unc 867 (June 25, 1945);
Neuberger, Their Brother's Keeper, 29 SAT. REv. oF Lrr. No. 32; 4 (Aug. 10, 1946).
During the period of evacuation the Farm Security first took over Japanese farms,
but later relinquished control to the War Relocation Authority. See, generally, A, RE-
LOCATION AUTHomRTy, THE NVART HANDLING OF EvAcuEE PRoPmrry, 47-69 (1946),
and Comment, 51 YALE L. 3. 1316, 1327 (1942).
2. CAL.. GEN. LAWS, Acts 260, 261 (Deering 1944; Supp. 1945) ; Om. Comp. LAws
ANN. §§ 61-101-12, 201-4 (1940; Supp. 1945); WASH. REv. STAT. § 10581-92 (Reming-
ton 1932; Supp. 1940). See generally, Miller, Alien Land Laws, 8 Gro. VASH. L RFv. 1
(1939); GmsoN, ALI:S AND THE LAW 45-85 (1940); KoN.vrrz, THE Ax,. AND Asi-
ATIc IN A'sanrCAN LAW, 157-70 (1946).
3. The phrase, "ineligible for citizenship," initially operated to exclude all Asiatics,
since all "white persons, persons of African nativity or descent, and descendants of races
indigenous to the Western Hemisphere" are eligible for citizenship. 54 STAT. 1140 (1940),
8 U.S.C.A. §703 (1942). But in 1943 and 1946 Chinese and East Indians were granted
eligibility, so the prohibition for all practical purposes, now applies solely to Japanese. See
notes 92-3 infra.
4. See e.g., Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 73 (1942) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 123,
130 (1940) ; Mendez v. Westminster School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1946);
Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 943 (D. Mass. 1944).
5. See notes 134-6 infra.
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The first of the West Coast alien land laws was enacted in 1913, and the
constitutionality was established during the following decade.0 Nevertheless,
.for a number of years prior to World War II, enforcement was only half-
hearted. Legal loopholes, administrative inactivity, and public indifference
enabled Japanese aliens to circumvent many of the prohibitions. At the same
time-perhaps-prejudice was dwindling on the Coast.
However, the federal program for relocation of the Japanese in 1942 pro-
vided an unparalleled opportunity for the state governments to conduct in-
vestigations and adopt plans for systematic discrimination, under color of
law, against the Japanese-born upon their return.7 Moreover, the ease with
which federal authorities had succumbed to old wives' tales about Black
Dragon societies, Emperor worship, and sabotage cults endowed anti-Nip-
ponism with an intellectual acceptability which it had not possessed during
the more reasoning thirties.
Accordingly, the California and Oregon legislatures both amended their
existing laws during the war years so as to provide for more strict control of
Japanese land ownership,8 and in 1945 the Attorney General of California
was given an appropriation to expedite investigation by the counties of alien
land law evasionY Upon ascertainment, the state, in conjunction with the
county, was to institute escheat proceedings, after which the land was to be
sold, and the proceeds divided between state and county.'0
Such proceedings received judicial sanction by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Oyanta.'1 Before the war defendant, a Japanese
alien, had farmed land held in the name of his minor citizen-son. Shortly
after defendant's return from the wartime relocation center, California offi-
cials commenced an escheat action based on evidence gathered during his
enforced absence. The California court upheld the state's contention that
6. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) ; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225
(1923) ; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923) ; Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923).
7. Activity among the California District Attorneys was particularly fervid. See
Pacific Citizen, March 11, 1944, p. 1, col. 4; April 15, 1944, p. 2, col. 2; April 22, 1944, p.
2, col. 1; June 3, 1944, p. 2, col. 5. Proposals for an initiative measure prohibiting Japa-
nese-American citizens from owning land was also launched by the Native Sons of the
Golden West, a notorious nativist organization. Pacific Citizen, March 18, 1944, p. 2, col.
4; April 29, 1944, p. 3, col. 3. Arkansas, in 1943, passed such a measure. Pope Supp.
1944 p. 618; Laws, 1943, Act 47, p. 74. A similar proposal was rejected by the Colorado
Senate. Pacific Citizen, Feb. 12, 1944, p. 1, col. 5.
Japanese in America were the subject of detailed scrutiny by the California "little
Dies" committee, of which Senator Jack B. Tenney was chairman. See Report of the
Joint Fact-finding Committee on Un-American Activities in California to California
Legislature, SEN. DAILY JOuRNAL, April 9, 1943, 1464-94; April 16, 1945, 1441-62; June
14, 1945, 3856-76.
8. CAL. STATS. 1943, cc. 1003, 1059; 1945, cc. 1129, 1136; Ore. Sess. Laws (1945) c.
436. For discussion of these enactments see pp. 1024-5 infra.
9. CAL. STATS., 1945, c. 1458.
10. Bus. WFK 50-1 (Aug. 4, 1945).
11. 173 P. 2d 794 (Cal. 1946) ; cert. granted, 15 U.S.L. Week 3376 (April 7, 1947).
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placement of title in his son's name was mere subterfuge and a violation of
the provisions of the land law.'2 Accordingly, the court decreed escheat.
The possibility of similar action pursuant to alien land legislation in Oregon
and Washington has sufficient in terrorcm effect to cause apprehension among
the returning Japanese.13 It is probable that instances comparable to that of
the Oyanur case will arise in those two states also, and that the Supreme
Court of the United States will have abundant opportunity to reconsider the
constitutionality of the alien land laws; 4
BACKGROUND OF THE ALIEN LAND LAWS
Alien Ownership of Land at Common Law and Convenitional Statutory
Modifications. At common law an alien could acquire land by purchase-sale,
inter vivos transfer, or devise-and hold it against all but the sovereign, who
could divest it from him by the procedure of "office found."10 Historical
basis for this disability lay in apprehension for the "security of the realm,"
which was thought to be endangered by the amount of Norman-owned land
during the thirteenth century.16 An alien, however, could not take by opera-
tion of law-descent, dower, or curtesy-on the theory that the law would not
do a futile thing by giving with one hand only to take away with the other.
Thus, if an alien died intestate, his land escheated since he was said to have
no "inheritable" blood.17
All American jurisdictions have modified the common law by constitution
or statute.'8 The state laws vary in detail but fall generally into well-defined
classifications: some treat all aliens alike; others distinguish between resident
and non-resident aliens, between alien friends and alien enemies, between
12. 173 P.2lat 803.
13. At the present time a group of Japanese American citizens contemplate bringing
a declaratory judgment action to challenge the Oregon alien land laws. Communication
from Allan Hart, Esq., member of the Oregon bar, Dec. 20, 1946.
14. Certiorari was granted in The Oyama case; Oyama v. California, 15 U.S.L
VEEx 3376 (April 17,1947).
15. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U.S. 1813) ; Baker v. Shy,
9 Heiskell 85, 89-90 (Tenn. 1871). See 5 TFFANY, REAL Paor Ey, § 1377 (Jones ed.
1939).
16. 9 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 92-3 (1926).
17. 5 TIFFANY loc. cit. supra note 15.
18. See generally on state statutes 5 VERNrER, Au.ticAx FAXmILY LAWS §§ 288-9,
291-2 (1938) ; Gmsox, op. cit. supra note 2, at 46-8, Table 4, Appendix B; MEAMs, RzSi-
DENT ORIENTALS ON THE A mymc~x PAcIIC COAST 163-5 (1927). For discussion of par-
ticular state legislation see Pratt, Present Alienage Disabilities under New Yorh State
Law in Real Property, 12 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1942) ; Orfield, Alicn Land Rights in
Nebraska, 17 NiBR. L. Buu.m 3 (1938); Ward, The Mississippi Alien Statute, 11 Miss.
L. 3. 313 (1939); Comment Right of an Alien to Own Land in Texas, 7 TE . L. lcv.
607 (1929). Utah, formerly the only state preserving the common law as to alien land
ownership, could not resist the trend during World War II: it enacted an Alien Property
Law almost identical with the California lawv, prohibiting ownership of real property to
aliens ineligible for citizenship. Utah Laws, 1943, CI. 6a; UTAH Cona Az.z., § 78-6a
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aliens eligible and ineligible for citizenship, between those who have declared
their intention to become citizens and those who have not."0 In all cases the
favored classifications are normally under no disability, whereas the right of
disfavored groups to own land is either narrowly circumscribed or flatly de-
nied.
Power to grant, prohibit, limit, and regulate rights of alien land ownership
is traditionally considered an attribute of state "sovereignty," lurking within
the interstices of the Tenth Amendment. In the absence of a treaty or Act
of Congress operating within a constitutionally delegated "federal field," this
power of the states has never been questioned by the courts. 20
Alien Land Lasus on the Pacific Coast: the Preliminaries. The Pacific
Coast states' employment of alien land legislation as a vehicle for racial dis-
crimination stems from the influx of Japanese to the West Coast following
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 188221 and the legalization of Japanese labor
emigration by the Emperor in 1890.22 The number of immigrants was suffi-
ciently great to cause alarm among West Coast "whites."' ' Although con-
stitutional and legislative discriminatory measures were proposed in the
1890's, they received serious consideration only after 1900, the year of great-
est Japanese immigration. 24 Presidential intervention in California pre-
vented enactment of alien land laws in 1909 and 1911,2 but by 1913 opinion
was strong enough to secure passage despite intercession by Secretary of
State Bryan.28  The 1913 Act has been termed our first official act of dis-
crimination against the Japanese.27
(Supp. 1945). However this section has recently been repealed. See N.Y. Times, April
20, 1947, § 4, p. 6-E, col. 5. One of the most far-reaching modifications is Wisc. CoNsT.,
Art. I, § 15 ("No distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and citi-
zens, in reference to the possession, enjoyment or descent of property.")
19. See 5 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 305-9.
20. See notes 70-1 infra.
21. 22 STAT. 59 (1882), 8 U.S.C.A. §263 (1942).
22. The demand for cheap labor formerly satisfied by Chinese was now fulfilled by
immigrant Japanese. H.R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 59-64 (1942) (herein-
after referred to as TOLA. REPORT); Buell, The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agi-
tation in the United States: I, 37 POL. Sc. Q. 605 (1922).
23. TOLAN REPORT 72.
24. Ibid.
25. The 1909 session of the California legislature was rife with anti-Japanese bills.
At President Theodore Roosevelt's suggestion the alien land bill was amended to include
all aliens. TOLAN REPoRT 76. It has been suggested that this change, objectionable to
British landholding interests, was responsible for the defeat of the bill. Id. at 77; Mc-
WILLIAmS, PREJUDICE, JAPANESE AmERICANS: SYMBoL OF RAcIAL INTOLEUAlCD, 45
(1944) (hereinafter cited as McWLIAms, PRE.JUDICE). Presidential intervention again
helped defeat an alien land bill in 1911. TOLAN REPoRT 77.
26. Ibid. See McWIILIAms, PREjuDiCE 45; KONvrTZ, op. cit. supra note 2, at 158-60;
Buell, The Development of Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States: II, 38 POL. ScI.
Q. 57, 60-5 (1923).
27. McWm.IrAms, PREJUDICE 45.
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Anti-Japanese sentiment, dormant during World War I, acquired fresh
vitality shortly afterwards2s and inspired a new California law, adopted by
Initiative,2 which became the archetype for land acts passed thereafter by
other western states.30 The Act provided that all aliens eligible for citizen-
ship under federal law might "acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit and inherit
real property, or any- interest therein" in the same manner as citizens.31
Other (i.e. ineligible) aliens32 and corporations with a majority of ineligible
alien stockholders33 might be accorded identical rights only if so guaranteed
by treaty. 3 Nor could an ineligible alien become guardian for a minor-citi-
zen's estate in land.a
Property acquired in violation of the Act, or by colorable transfers with
intent to evade the law,35 was subjected to escheat in proceedings brought by
the Attorney General or county attorney a3 In such proceedings, a prima fa-
de presumption of intent to evade was to arise upon proof of payment of con-
sideration by the alien, registration of title in the name of an alien-controlled
corporation, or execution of a mortgage in favor of an ineligible alien who sub-
sequently took possession, control, or management.37 However, property
obtained by enforcement of a lien or mortgage or in good faith to secure a
debt was exempted from the Act's prohibitions, but the land was to be dis-
posed of within two years. 38 Conspiracy to effect a transfer violative of the
Act was made criminally punishable3 9 Systematic enforcement of the Act was
delayed until its constitutionality had been determined three years later by the
United States Supreme Court.4 °
28. ToLAiT REPORT 81-2; Buell, sapra note 26, at 65.
29. Alien Property Initiative Act of 1920 Cal. Stats. 1921, p. L--iL See generally
on events surrounding passage of this act, ToLAx REPORT 84-6, fcNrznL%,'us, PntmUCZ,
57-66; PAjus, THE REAL JAPAxEsE CALiroRxiA 91-100 (1937). For the two contempo-
rary opposing points of view compare CALiFoRN A STATE Bo.= OF Co.nor, CALIw.romNA
AxD THE ORIENTAL (1920) with AmmcAN COMM=tTEE OF JUSTIcE; CAL.IoRLa.A Aza
THE JAPANESE; ARGU~MENTS AGAINST T E ALIE LAND LAWr (1920).
30. ToL 'x REPORT 86; KoNvrrz, op. cit. mtpra note 2, at 161.
31. CAl. GEN. LAws (Deering 1944) Act 261, § 1.
32. Id. § 2.
33. Id. § 3.
33a. This proviso, in conjunction with the Japanese-American treaty of 1911, in effect
meant that Japanese aliens were precluded only from holding agricultural land. See note
128, infra, and related text
34. Id. § 4. This section was intended to foreclose an obvious loophole in the law,
since each Japanese alien with an American born child had at hand a potential landowner
whose estate would need guardianship.
35. Id. § 9.
36. Id. § 7.
37. Id. § 9.
38. Id. § 7.
39. Id. § 10.
40. In Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). See 1fMcVmLuIxs, PnjuMicu 64.
There had been considerable doubt expressed whether the laws were constitutional and the
19471 1021
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The Oregon Alien Land Law, adopted in 1923,4 followed the California
Act of 1920 almost verbatim and the Washington law,42 though differing in
form and couched in somewhat more positive language, had basically the same
effect. The only notable provisions missing from the Washington act were
those relating to conspiracy and to the presumption of intent to evade.
The First Court Tests. Constitutional validation of west coast alien land
legislation came in 1923 when the Supreme Court upheld the Washington law
in Terrace v. Thompson.4 3 In this case the citizen-owner of agricultural land
sought an injunction to restrain enforcement of the alien land law against
himself and his ineligible alien lessee. In affirming dismissal of the bill the
Court, through Mr. Justice Butler, restated the proposition that, in the ab-
sence of a treaty, a state has power to deny all aliens the right to own land and
is free also to make classifications based on declaration of intention to be-
come citizens.44 The fact that the lessee was of a race ineligible for citizen-
ship under federal law was held not of itself enough to render such a classifi-
cation arbitrary, unreasonable, or a denial of equal protection, since a state
might well assume that Congress had acted reasonably in setting up classifica-
tions for naturalization.48 The court felt also that the Washington act did not
contravene any portion of the 1911 treaty with Japan since reciprocal right to
ownership of agricultural land was specifically omitted from the treaty.40
The California law was held constitutional on the same day in the compan-
ion case of Porterfield v. Webb47 on the basis of the Terrace decision. Two
cases decided a few days later also involved the California law. In Frick v.
Webb48 the court upheld Section 3 of the Initiative Act which prohibited in-
eligible aliens from owning stock in a landholding corporation, and in Webb
v. O'Brien4 9 the court determined that a "cropping contract" gave an alien
decision of the Supreme Court upholding them was surprising to many. See Ibid.; and
see Collins, Will the California Alien Land Law Stand the Test of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment? 23 YALE L. J. 330 (1914).
41. bre. Laws, 1923, ch. 98, §§ 1-10, Omz. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 61-101-11 (1940).
42. Wash. Laws, 1921, Ch. 50, §§ 1-11, WAsH. Rzv. STAT. §§ 10581-92 (Remington
1932). The Washington land law is framed to prohibit only those who have not in good
faith declared their intention of becoming a citizen. Since alien Japanese, ineligible to
become citizens, may not file declarations of intention, the law has the same ultimate ef-
fect.
43. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
44. Id. at 219.
45. The real basis of Mr. Justice Butler's opinion lay, submittedly, in the legalistic
trick of assuming his conclusion. He wrote: "The quality and allegiance of those who
own, occupy and use the farm lands within its borders are matters of highest importance
and affect the safety and power of the state itself." Id. at 221. No showing had been made
nor proof elicited that the quality and allegiance of the Japanese alien farmer was either
inferior to or different from that of the native "white." See Cohen, Book Review, 56
YAi. L. J. 910, 911 (1947).
46. 263 U.S. 197, 222 (1923).
47. 263 U.S. 225 (1923).
48. 263 U.S. 326 (1923).
49. 263 U.S. 313 (1923).
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such an interest in the land as to be violative of the Act, although previously
the California supreme court had ruled to the contraryW
Develapments 1928-1941. The California legislatures, in the first few years
after the Supreme Court's capitulation to legalized discrimination, amended
the Act so as to broaden the scope of the prohibitions: to the disability of in-
eligible aliens to acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and inherit land was added
to "use, cultivate, occupy, and transfer," and to have "in whole or in part, the
beneficial use of real property."51 Cropping contracts were specifically in-
cluded as an "interest" in land. 2 Difficulty experienced by the state in prov-
ing alienage was obviated by a 1927 procedural statute declaring that in any
action under the alien land laws the burden of proving citizenship or eligi-
bility, after proof of "interest in the land" and mere allegation of ineligibility,
shifted to the defehdant.5 3 An amendment provided also that proof of mem-
bership in an ineligible race along with proof of an "interest" in land, created
a prima facie presumption of ineligibility after which the burden devolved on
the defendant to prove citizenship or eligibility.U4 The guardianship section of
the 1920 Act had been declared unconstitutional by the California supreme
court,15 and in its stead was substituted a section permitting a citizen child of
an ineligible alien to name his father as guardian, but imposing rigid limita-
tions on the guardian's conduct.50
After Terrace v. Thompson and its consorts, the constitutionality of the
alien land laws was apparently deemed unassailable T litigation during the
ensuing years dealt only with collateral sections and ancillary issues not
clearly controlled by the Supreme Court decisions. A guardianship statute
similar to that invalidated by the California court was held constitutional in
Washington, s although Vashington courts have generally been more reluctant
than those of California to find intent to evade the land laws in the absence of
clear and convincing proof.r9 The California presumption statutes have gen-
50. Ex parte Okahara, 191 Cal. 353, 216 Pac. 614 (1923).
51. Cal. Stats., 1923, c. 441, pp. 1020-1.
52. Id. at p. 1023. "Cropping Contracts" conventionally allow the alien possession as
an independent contractor with complete control of cultivation, harvesting, handling and
delivering the crop, enjoying unlimited discretion as to hours and vages in return for a
percentage (usually one-half) of the net proceeds of sale. See Dudley v. Lowell, 201 Cal.
376, 377-8, 257 Pac. 57, 58 (1927).
53. Cal. Stats. 1927, ct 528, p. 881, CA. Gmr. LAws Act 261, § 9a (Deering 1944).
54. Ibid. CAT- Gzx. LAws Acr 261, § 9b (Deering, 1944).
55. Estate of Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995 (1922).
56. Cal. Stats., 1923, c. 441, p. 1021, CAl. Gm. Lws Act 261, § 4 (Deering 1944).
57. For analysis and criticism of the Supreme Court decisions see Powell, Alien Land
Cases in the United States Supreme Court 12 Cx.. L. Rv. 259 (1924).
58. In re Fujimoto's Guardianship, 130 Vash. 188, 226 Pac. 505 (1924).
59. See State v. Kosai, 133 Wash. 442, 451-2, 234 Pac. 5, 9 (1925) (land allegedly
held in trust for alien, court said fraud is never presumed) ; State v. Kurita, 136 Wash.
426, 430, 240 Pac., 554, 555 (1925) (question of a dummy corporation; no direct evidence,
though inferences were strong) ; State v. Natsuhara, 136 Wash. 437, 444, 240 Pac. 557,
560 (1925) (law not meant to apply to leases for "reasonable" length of time) ; State v.
19471 1023
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
erally been upheld,0° but, as applied to a criminal land holding case, the prima
facie presumption of alienage on proof of membership in an ineligible race
was declared a denial of due process. 6' Ownership of non-agricultural land,
on the other hand, has been universally held not to contravene the act.02
Despite the explicit language of the statutes and the judicial imprimatur of
constitutionality, agricultural land continued to be held by and for ineligible
aliens during the years between the adoption of the California Initiative Act
and the outbreak of the war with Japan. Difficulties of investigation, public
ajiathy and the ingenuity of clever counsel combined to render the alien land
laws ineffectual, if not a dead letter.63 The courts themselves on occasion
winked at devices dearly designed to avoid the stringency of the laws.
0 4
Recent enforcement legislation. In California enabling amendments were
passed in 1943 giving the Attorney General declaratory and injunctive rem-
edies in actiQns under the Act and giving public documents prima facie effect
on questions of eligibility for citizenship. 6 A significant substantive amend-
ment was also added, prohibiting any person from entering into an agreement
,to transfer an interest in land (including leases and cropping contracts) to a
wife or child of an ineligible alien or to any one planning to hold land for an
ineligible alien if the person entering into the agreement knew the ineligible
alien was to be permitted to "go upon the land," farm, cultivate, or enjoy the
beneficial use thereof. If such an agreement is made, and subsequently, the
ineligible alien does in fact "go upon the land," the person entering into the
agreement is guilty of a violation of the act and subject to punishment.00
In 1945 Oregon also enacted this provision 7 and passed, in addition, three
McGonigle, 144 Wash. 252, 260, 253 Pac. 655, 656-7 (1927) (defendant took title allegedly
for use of alien; plaintiff's information insufficient and defective).
60. People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 286 Pac. 1025 (1930), 3 So. CAIaF. L. Rav. 423,
44 HARv. L. RLv. 121.
61. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 94 (1934).
62. Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928), 2 So. CALir. L. REv. 298 (Japa-
nese Hospital) ; Gonzalez v. Ito, 12 Cal. App. 2d, 124, 55 P. 2d 262 (1936) (garage build-
ing and lot) ; Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 76 Adv. Cal. App. 442, 172 P. 2d 103 (1946)
(motion picture theatre). All these decisions opined that the issue was concluded by the
provision in the 1911 Treaty with Japan which granted reciprocal rights to nationals to
engage in "trade or commerce." 37 STAT. 1504.
63. See, generally, as to their ineffectiveness TOLA" REPOR, 78, 86; STRoNa, Tnu.
SEcoND GEN TarioN JAPA2NEsE PROBLEM 211-2 (1934) ; KONVITZ, op. cit. scpra note 2, at
167; McWiz.ms, PREuDcE, 65; Note 6 WASH. L. Ray. 127 (1931).
64. People v. Fujita, 215 Cal. 166, 8 P. 2d 1011 (1932) (payment of purchase price
and subsequent moving on land held not to violate land laws) ; Takiguchi v. Arizona, 47
Ariz. 302, 55 P. 2d 802 (1936) (Injunction not proper remedy to enforce compliance).
See6 WASH. L. Rav. 127 (1931).
65. Cal. Stats. 1943, ch. 1059, §§ 4-6, 8, CAL. Gax. LAws Act 261 §§ lob-c, 12a (Deer-
ing, 1944). Public documents include certified copies of records, files, and documents of
any public body, authority department, bureau, and agency, or entries, records, and files
made by a public officer or employee in performance of his duty. Ibid.
66. Cal. Stats. 1943, ch. 1059, § 7, CAT.. GEN. LAws Act 261, § Ila (Deering, 1944).
67. Ore. Laws, 1945, ch. 436, §.5; Om Comp. LAws ANN. § 61-201, (Suppo 1944-5).
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procedural statutes :Gs a presumption of ineligibility statute similar to the 1927
California section; a provision wherein proof by the state that the alien was
not a registered voter in the county wherein the land was located created a
prima facie presumption that he was ineligible for citizenship; and a statute
declaring that an ineligible alien who tills, farms, or works any land shall be
presumed69 to be the owner of a leasehold or some interest in that land. Of
the west coast states Washington alone failed to tighten its alien land laws
during the war.
The recent -exhumation and renewed enforcement of the west coast alien
land laws represent a recrudescence of prejudice hardly to be condoned. Not-
withstanding Terrace v. Thompson, it is believed that direct constitutional at-
tack is not foreclosed. A different judicial climate of opinion and changed
circumstances on the coast may render the legislation offensive both to the
Fourteenth Amendment and to the exclusive power of Congress over the
"federal fields."
STATE CONTROL AND THE FOURTEENTH AME.\'DmENT
Conventional doctrine accords the state complete power to regulate owner-
ship, descent, and use of land within its borders, except where limited by the
federal constitution.-0 Accordingly, state exercise of the sovereign power to
prohibit all aliens from owning land has been generally affirmed." The
Fourteenth Amendment however imposes limitations on the unbridled power
.of the state over persons and property. The due process and equal protection
-clauses unlike the privileges and immunities clause, are available to "persons,"
as well as citizens and include aliens--eligible, ineligible, and (possibly)
•enemy. 2 To protect the individual's liberty and property from arbitrary and
-discriminatory class legislation has been considered the functional justification
for these two clauses.73 Accordingly, judicial attacks on the Pacific Coast
alien land laws might well proceed under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amend-
mnent.
Classificatiou and the Equal Protection Clause. Most manifest today would
seem the conflict of the alien land laws with the equal protection clause.
"Equal protection," concededly, does not bar the possibility of classification. 4
68. Ore. Laws, 1945, ch. 436, §§ 2-4, OR& Comp'. LAWs Am.. §§ 61-202-4 (Supp.
1944-5).
69. Nothing in the language of the statute indicates whether this presumption shall
be conclusive or rebuttable. To regard it as conclusive would seem clearly a denial of
procedural due process, and even to give it only prima fade effect would seem to transcend
-the bounds of reasonableness. See discussion p. 1032 infra.
70. United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320-1 (1876).
71. Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U.S. 580, 582-3 (1915). See Mager v. Grimm 8
How. 490, 493 (U.S. 1850); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, (1879); Fnzum,
ToLcE PowER § 706 (1904) ; 72 U. oF PA. L. REv. 148, 151 (1924).
72. 16 STAT. 140 (1870), 8 U.S.C.A, §41 (1942) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
<1886).
73. FI u n, PolicE PowER § 134 (1904).
74. Id. at§§ 610,682,721-5.
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A state, upon ascertaining an evil which is within its power to correct, may,
in the interest of the public weal, project legislation against any class it rea-
sonably finds to be the cause of that evil." The traditional touchstone is the
existence of a reasonable relation between the condition to be remedied and
the subjects of the classification. 76
The distinction between "alien" and "citizen" has been upheld by courts as
a reasonable classification for state legislation regulating ownership of land,71
the right to hold public office,78 licensing of hunting and fishing,71 possession
of firearms,80 and the privilege of operating a billiard hall.,' In all these
instances, however, the classification embraced all aliens; where a class within
a class had been created,8 2 the courts have walked warily. A California
statute prohibiting aliens ineligible to become electors from fishing in certain
streams was held to deny them equal protection of the laws,8 3 and the Califor-
nia prohibition against ineligible alien guardianship was invalidated for the
same reason.84 Nor have courts been reluctant to notice the effect rather than
the mere language of a statute in striking down laws based on arbitrary dis-
criminations. A San Francisco ordinance, innocent enough on its face, requir-
ing operators of frame-house laundries to obtain approval of the Board of
Commissioners was declared a discrimination based on "race" and a denial
of equal protection since its impact was felt only by Chinese laundry opera-
tors, who alone were the owners of frame establishments.8 5 A Board of
Health requirement that all male inmates of a city jail have their hair clipped,
allegedly a sanitary regulation, was held unconstitutional because its designed
75. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914).
76. FRauND, PoLicE Powz § 612; See 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. Ray. 242, 245, 248 (1940).
77. See cases cited note 71 supra; 5 VERNM , op. cit. supra note 18 at 304-38. GisoN,
op. cit. supra note 2 at 45-61.
78. Ore. Laws, 1923 ch. 121. See generally MEAas, op. cit. supra note 18, at 330-1.
Similarly a state statute prohibiting contractors from employing aliens on public works
has been upheld. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). But see Powell, The Right to
Work for the State, 16 COL. L. REv. 99 (1916).
79. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) ; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
138 (1914). See, for criticism of these two cases, Kouvirz, op. cit. .rpra note 2, at 212-8.
See generally on hunting and fishing restrictions MzAs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 218-37.
80. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
81. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927). For tabular presentation of legisla-
tion restricting occupations open to aliens see KoNviTz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 190-211.
See generally 5 VRNImR, op. cit. mupra note 18, at 389-401; O'Connor, Constitutional Pro-
tection of the Aliens Right to Work, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 483 (1941); Branse, State
Laws Barring Aliens from Professions and Occupations 3 IMMIG. AND NAT. SoR. Mo.
REv., 281 (1946) ; 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 242 (1940).
82. Indeed it has been suggested that a class within a class within a class has been
created in the case of persons subject to the disabilities of the land laws: aliens generally,
aliens ineligible for citizenship, and aliens ineligible for citizenship but given the right to
hold land by treaty. MEA~s, op. cit. mcpra note 18 at 167.
83. In re Ah Chong, 2 Fed. 733 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
84. Estate of Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995 (1922).
85. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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effect was to expose Chinese prisoners, shorn of their queues, to disrespect
and disgrace among their countrymen;8 Mr. Justice Field in vigorous
language8 7 proclaimed the duty of the Court to invalidates s attempts to shake
off the inhibition of the equal protection clause.
No less unreasonable and arbitrary is the basis for classification employed
by the alien land laws: i.e. eligibility for citizenship. The fact that the states
have adopted a federal naturalization standard has weighed heavily with the
courts on the theory that it is reasonable for the state to adopt a classification
employed by Congress. 9 On further analysis, however, this rationale seems
unconvincing and superficial. Assuming that the congressional classification
based on "race" is reasonable for the purpose of the naturalization laws,O it
does not necessarily follow that it is equally reasonable when appropriated by
state legislatures for the purpose of controlling land ownership.P1
A state statute declaring Japanesc resident aliens ineligible to hold land
would seem clearly violative of the equal protection clause. To permit the
very same result couched in the language of the alien land laws, is to yield to
verbalisms. The discriminatory nature of the classification was highlighted in
1943 when Chinese were permitted to become citizens. -2 By the same token,
Chinese are now eligible to own land in the Pacific coast states. 3
86. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879). The fear of losing
his queue was calculated to provide assurance that the Chinese would pay his fine. See
also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) where the Supreme Court invalidated an Ari-
zona statute making it a misdemeanor for an employer not to employ 80o or more em-
ployees who were United States citizens.
87. "Probably the bastinado, or the knout, or the thumbscrew, or the rack, would ac-
complish the same end; and no doubt the Chinaman would prefer either of those modes of
torture to that which entails upon him disgrace among his countrymen. . ." Ho Ah
Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas. 252, 255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) "... we cannot shut our eyes
-to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we take our seats on the
'bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as
men.. :' Ibid.
88. "Against such legislation it will always be the duty of the judiciary to declare and
-enforce the paramount law of the nation' Id. at 257.
89. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220 (1923); Porterfield and Afizuno v.
Webb, 279 Fed. 114, 116 (S.D. Cal 1921). See also Comment, 31 YA1.x L J. 299, 304
(1922).
90. This assumption is open to serious question. See text and authorities pp. 1035-6
infra.
91. Congress, furthermore, since it is not subject to an "equal protection" clause, since
its power over naturalization is "exclusive," and since it may deny the privilege of citizen-
ship with or without reason, has a latitude not accorded the states. See Kovrrz, op. ci.
.snpra note 2 at 165-6; see also Comment, 10 CALiF. L. Rxv. 241, 245 (1922).
92. 57 Stat 601 (1943), 8 U.S.C.A. § 703 (Supp. 1946). In 1946 eligibility restric-
tions were similarly removed from Filipinos and peoples indigenous to India. 60 STAT.
416 (1946), 8 U.S.C.A. § 703 (Supp. 1946). See Carusi, Racial Bars Removed for Fili-
,piws and East Indians, 4 IMumG. AND NAT. Szn. Mo. REV. 1 (1946).
93. See Weinstok and Landels, Right of Chinese Aliens to Take Title to Lard, 19
,CAizm. S.B.J. 19 (1944) ; KoNvrrz, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 167.
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Attempts to justify the reasonableness of the classification have been no-
tably unsubstantial and non-persuasive. It was said that "it is within the
realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state, might pass to the
ownership or possession of a non-citizen." 4 Whatever validity this statement
may have had when uttered, it flies in the face of reality today. Since the
cessation of authorized Japanese immigration in 1924,05 the American Japa-
nese population has become preponderantly-and increasingly-native born.
In 1940 there were 47,305 Japanese aliens (i.e., foreign born) as compared
with 79,642 born in this country,9 the number of foreign born Japanese
having decreased 36% since 1920,97 and more than half of them were over 50
years old.98 Agricultural statistics are similarly fatal to the bogey of land
domination. In 1941, Japanese-alien and citizen-operated only 3.9% of the
total number of farms in California, 1% in Washington, and 0.6% in
Oregon.99 Of the total cropland they harvested but 2.9% in California,
0.33% in Washington, and 0.3% in Oregon. 10° However, their crop production
has been out of all proportion to their relatively small holdings; almost half of
the west coast truck crops were produced on Japanese operated truck farms.1 '
Animosity against the Japanese farmer doubtless arose in part from the fact
that, through intelligence and industry, he outstripped his "white" competitors
in the techniques of efficient farming. 0 2 It seems anomalous however to
discourage such efficiency by means of prohibitory land legislation. Even as-
suming there are elements of unfair competition among the alien farm-work-
ers, the state and the trade unions have at their disposal methods more effec-
94. Terrace v. Thompson, 274 Fed. 841, 849 (W.D. Wash. 1921) quoted with ap-
proval by Mr. Justice Butler in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220 (1923).
95. The Japanese Exclusion Act closed the doors to Japanese immigration. 43 STAT.
161 (1924), 8 U.S.C.A. §213 c (1942).
96. This amounts to 62.7% citizen and 37.3% alien. II CHARACTEIuSTICS OF TU E
POPULATION: PART 1, 16th Census, 1940, 21. For statistical studies of Japanese-American
population see STRONG, op. cit. supra note 63, at 152-66; ICHIHASHI, JAPANESE IN THE
UNITED STATES, 94-105 (1932) ; PAjus, op. cit. supra note 29, at 155-62 (California only).
97. II CHAAcT'Isr'cs OF THE POPULATION: PART 1, 16th Census, 1940, 21.
98. ToLAN REPORT, 91.
99. TOLAN REPORT, 117, 131, 135. In 1940,there were 5,135 Japanese operated farms
in California, 706 in Washington and 277 in Oregon. Ibid. Of the total in California, 70
were tenant farmers. Ibid.
100. Ibid. Certain areas, however, have much higher percentages of Japanese har-
vested cropland. Ibid. See also on Japanese-American agriculture, Poli and Engstrand,
Japawse Agriculture ois the Pacific Coast, 21 J. LAND AND PUB. UTIL. ECON. 352, 353, 356
(1945) ; MEARS, op. cit. supra note 18, at 238-61, 408-20 (tables) ; ICIXHASaI, op. cit.
supra note 96, at 160-206; PAjus, op. cit. supra note 29, at 145-54 (California only) ;
M mILs, THE JAPANESE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 103-96 (1915); Rademaker,
The Japanese in the Social Organization of the Puget Sound Region, 40 Am. J. OF Soc.
338, 340-1 (1934).
101. Poli and Engstrand, supra note 100, at 357. In California it was estimated that
as high as 90% of the snap beans, celery, peppers, and strawberries were grown on Japa-
nese operated truck farms. TOLAX REPORT, 117.
102. See Powell, supra note 57, at 281-2; Poli and Engstrand, supra note 100, at 361-2.
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five, more direct, and less drastic than foreclosure of opportunity to till the
soil.103
Much has been said concerning absence of loyalty to the United States on
the part of the resident Japanese alien. 0 4 The experience of investigators,
however, at the time of the war evacuation program, does not support this
conclusion. Loyalty and allegiance were not found to follow the clean-cut
lines of "alien" and "citizen."' 10 As much disaffection was discovered among
the citizen nisei as among their alien parents.10 The only valid conclusion the
federal authorities could reach was that each case must be investigated indi-
vidually.10 7 The key to the whole situation, it is submitted, is found not in
formal analysis, but in the recurrent pattern of vague generalities about racial
inferiority, unassimilability, unwillingness to accept the responsibilities of
citizenship, oriental penchant for deceit, and eternal fidelity to the Emperor.
The early Japanese land cases, like the whole structure of constitutional race
discrimination of which they are a part, are the products of an ignorant and
unconsidered attitude toward colored peoples which urgently calls for re-
examination in the light of modern sociology and anthropology. The constitu-
tional ethnology of the earlier Supreme Court is antiquated folk-lore of a
primitive kind belonging with the economic shibboleths of Field and Peck-
ham010 If American law is to be cured of the deep-seated disease of racism,
the alien land laws must submit to the judicial scalpel.
A further apparent denial of equal protection, which extends to citizens as
well as aliens, seems to result from the recent California and Oregon amend-
ments1' making it punishable to enter into any agreement for the purchase
and sale of land if an ineligible alien is subsequently permitted to derive any
benefit whatsoever from the land."" Thus if a vendor sells to a citizen-wife
103. California has had little trouble finding ways to control and regulate her agri-
cultural interests. CAL. STATs. 1933 c. 754, p. 1969, C.m. Gni. LAws, Act 143a (Deering,
1944) (regulating harvesting and marketing of raisins, by restricting competition and
maintaining price levels) upheld in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
104. So runs the tenor of most anti-Japanese criticism. See Tm Am=- n: Oun
MimsT (Grant and Davison ed. 1930) passim; CALirowu ST.,xT BoD or CoNxnoL, op.
cit. supra note 29, at 181-91; Report of thw Joint Fact-Finding Committee on Un-Amncri-
can. Activities in California, SEN. DAILy JOURNJL, June 14, 1945, pp. 3856--76, Cal. Legis.,
56th Sess. See discussion in Mc Viu.Aus, PRJUnICF, 121-6.
105. See statements by Attorney General Warren (Cal.) and Mayor Earl Millikin of
Seattle. TOLAN RFPORT, 142-3.
106. Ibid. See also Comment, 51 YAmn L. J. 1316 (1942).
107. Id. at 147-51. See also Comment, 51 YA.nz L. J. 1316, 1337-S (1942).
108. See Cohen, Book Review, 56 YA.E L. J. 910, 912 (1946), and, generally items cited
note 104 supra.
109. Cal. Stats. 1943, c. 1059, § 7, CA. GFx. LAWs Act 261, § Ila, (Deering, 1944); Ore.
Laws 1945, c. 436, § 1, Oe Comn. LAWS ANN. § 61-201 (Supp. 1944-5).
110. "§ la. Leases, etc., in name of uife, child or other person, uith allowances of
beneficial use to alien: Violation of acts: Punishment: Injunction proceedings. Whenever
leases, cropping agreements, or any other agreements to acquire, possess, enjoy, use, culti-
vate, occupy and transfer real property for farming or agricultural purposes or to transfer
19471 1029
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or child of an ineligible alien, both vendor and vendee would be liable for
criminal prosecution if the ineligible alien so much as lived on the farm or was
supported by his wife or child from the agricultural earnings. Such an im-
position seems not only a denial of equal protection but also an abridgment of
the privileges and immunities guaranteed to all citizens.11' Justifications in
policy seem singularly lacking for statutes which permit a state under the
guise of its "police power" to legislate against a child's supporting his father.
Presumptions and the Due Process Clause. Other sections of the alien land
laws are vulnerable to attacks based on the unreasonableness of the statutory
presumptions. Though the courts thus far have upheld them,112 it is believed
that upon reexamination today their constitutionality would not stand. In any
action under the alien land laws, it will be recalled, proof of an "interest" in
the land and of membership in an ineligible race creates a prima facie pre-
sumption of ineligibility and places the burden of proving citizenship or in-
eligibility on the defendant.1 13 The statutes presume, in short, that any mem-
ber of antineligible race is an ineligible alien. Contemporary statistics indi-
in whole or in part the beneficial use of said lands are made in the name of the wife or
child of any alien mentioned in Section 2 of this act, or made in the name of any other
person, and when any such alien mentioned in Section 2 of this act is then or thereafter
allowed to remain or go upon the land, farm and cultivate same and enjoy directly or indi-
rectly the beneficial use of such said agricultural lands or obtains or has a beneficial in-
terest in or use of the proceeds received from the sale of the agricultural crops produced
on said lands, then any person signing or entering into any such agreement with knowl-
edge that any such alien shall be allowed or permitted to farm and cultivate such land and
enjoy directly or indirectly the beneficial use of such agricultural lands orhave a bene-
ficial interest in or use of the proceeds received from the sale of the agricultural crops
produced on said lands or any person who allows or permits any such alien to farm and
cultivate such lands and enjoy directly or indirectly the beneficial use of such agricultural
lands or obtain or have a beneficial interest in or use of the proceeds received from the
sale of the agricultural crops produced on said lands shall be guilty of violation of the
terms and provisions of this act, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished in the man-
ner provided in Section 10a hereof, and the Attorney General or the district attorney of
the proper county shall have the power to institute injunction proceedings in the name of
the people of the State of California against any and all such persons for the purpose of
enjoining and restraining them from carrying on farming operations on any agricultural
lands in the State of California, under the terms and provisions of any such said agree-
ments, contracts, or leases, as hereinbefore provided." CAL. GEN. LA vs Act 261, § 11a
(Deering, 1944).
111. U.S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
112. People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 286 Pac. 1025 (1930), 3 So. CALiF. L. Ray. 423, 44
HARv. L. Rrv. 121. See also Comment, 17 CALIF. L. REv. 575 (1929). But cf. Morrison v.
California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934) (denial of due process when applied in a criminal case).
113. "§9a. Citizenship must be proved by defendant. In any action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, by the state of California, or the people thereof, under any of the provisions
of this act, when the proof introduced by the state, or the people thereof, establishes the
acquisition, possession, enjoyment, use, cultivation, occupation, or transferring of real
property or any interest therein, or the having in whole or in part of the beneficial use
thereof by any defendant, or any of such fact, and the complaint, indictment or informa-
tion alleges the alienage and ineligibility to United States citizenship of such defendant,
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cate, however, that native-born Japanese outnumber aliens almost two to
one,'1 4 a fact which should seemingly create a presumption the other way. To
justify the presumption solely on the "balance of convenience" doctrine15 is
insufficient where a question of racial discrimination is involved." 0
The Oregon 1945 amendments create two more presumptions seemingly
equally violative of due process. In the light of the frequency with which land
in one county is owned by a voter in another, allowing proof of the fact that
an alien is not a registered voter of the county in which the land is located to
create a prima facie presumption of ineligibility n 7 would hardly seem to
the burden of proving citizenship or eligibility to citizenship shall thereupon devolve upon
such defendant.
"§9b. Citizens ip or eligibility nuast be proved by defendant. In any action or pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, by the state of California, or the people thereof, under any of
the provisions of this act when the complaint, indictment or information alleges the alien-
age and ineligibility to United States citizenship of any defendant, proof by the state, or
the people thereof, of the acquisition, possessin, enjoyment, use, cultivation, occupation or
transferring of real property or any interest therein, or the having in whole or in part the
beneficial use thereof by such defendant, or of any such facts, and in addition proof that
such defendant is a member of a race ineligible to citizenship under the naturalization laws
of the United States, shall create a prima facie presumption of the ineligibility to citizen-
ship of such defendant, and the burden of proving citizenship or eligibility to citizenship as
a defense to any such action or proceeding shall thereupon devolve upon such defendant.
"The legislature hereby declares that its purpose in adopting this section is not to
modify, limit or affect in any manner the provisions of section 9a of this act." CAL. Gm .
LAws; Act 261, §§ 9a-b (Deering 1944).
The Oregon statute is substantially identical with § 9b of the California law, Or.
ComTP. LAws Air. § 61-202 (Supp. 1944-5).
114. ToLAx REroRT, 91; Poli and Engstrand, supra note 100, at 352.
115. Such, by implication at least, has been the justification for the presumption-i.e.
information to prove citizenship being presumably more accessible to the defendant than
evidence to disprove it by the state. See People v. Osaki 209 Cal. 169, 192, Z86 Pac. 1025,
1034 (1930), 3 So. CALIF. L. REv. 423 (1930). It is to be noted, however, that the statute
applies equally to the citizen-transferor as well as to the alien-transferee. Even conceding
that the fact of eligibility or citizenship may be more accessible to the alien, it is no more
known to the citizen than to the state. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 8 92-3
(1934).
116. The United States Supreme Court invalidated § 9a of the California act as applied
to a criminal proceeding, stating that the "convenience" test would not suffice. Morrison
v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 94 (1934), Comment, 22 CALMr. L. Rnv. 420 (1934). But see Mor-
gan, Federal Constitutional Limitations Upons Presumptions Created by State Legislation
in HAmvAIn LEGAL EssAys 323, 346-51 (Pound ed. 1934). The Supreme Court has re-
cently seen fit to reject the "balance of convenience" test uncoupled with a rational con-
nection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
117. "§ 61-203-Lack of voting registration prima fade presumption of ineligibility. In
any suit or action, civil or criminal, brought pursuant to the provisions of the laws of this
state relating to the rights, powers and disabilities of aliens with respect to property,
proof that the defendant is not a registered voter in the county in which the land involved
in any such suit or action is located shall establish a prima face presumption that such
person is ineligible to citizenship!' Omr. Comp. LAws AnN. § 61-203 (Supp. 1944-5).
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satisfy the test of a reasonable connection between that which is proved and
that which is to be inferred. Declaring that any ineligible alien working the
land shall be presumed to own a lease-hold or other interests in that land 18
seems equally unreasonable. The profusion of Japanese working on farms in
the capacity of mere laborers vitiates completely, it is submitted, the reason-
ableness of this presumption.")
CONFLICT WITH THE "FEDERAL FIELDs"
The Power over Immigration and Naturalization. Power of the federal
government over immigration and naturalization, commonly labelled "exclu-
sive," is one which the states may not invade.' 2° In the case of the alien land
laws, totally apart from any conflict, each change by the federal government
in racial eligibility for citizenship effects a simultaneous change in the scope
of their application. Should Congress declare tomorrow that resident Japa-
nese aliens shall be eligible for citizenship, their disabilities as to ownership of
real property on the West Coast would be removed.' 2 '
It may well be suggested that state legislation so inextricably meshed with
Congressional standards draws near the line of invading the "federal field."
A Michigan law prohibiting "undesirable aliens," as defined by federal law,
from intra-state employment was for that reason declared unconstitutional.1m
A Pennsylvania statute requiring compulsory registration of aliens was invali-
dated on similar grounds.123 To what extent the federal government may
retain power over resident aliens is as yet undelineated. 124 Where civil
118. "§ 61-204--Presumption of ownership. Any alien ineligible to own any interest in
land in the state of Oregon who shall till, farm or work upon said land, or occupy the
same in any capacity whatsoever, shall be presumed to be the owner of a leasehold or some
interest in said land." Oma. Coup. LAws ANN. § 61-204 (Supp. 1944-5).
119. There is no indication whether this presumption is to be considered conclusive or
rebuttable. Certainly if it were construed as an irrebuttable presumption, the statute
would appear violative of due process on its face. Probably, like the others, it is to be
considered merely a prima facie presumption, but, so conceding, it would seem to tran-
scend the test of reasonableness.
120. Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) ; the power over immigra-
tion was originally derived from the power over foreign commerce, Chy Lung v. Freeman,
92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875), whereas the power over naturalization stems from explicit lan-
guage in Article I, § 8, cl. 4 of the Constitution. As to the exclusive nature of Congress'
power over immigration see FREuND, POLIcE PowER § 71 (1904); WASSMuMxA1, THn
CHALLENGE OF OuR IMMIGRATION LAws 15 (1945).
121. Thus, the prohibition against Chinese and Filipinos owning real property disap-
peared with the Nationality Acts of 1943 and 1946 respectively. See notes 92-3 supra.
122. Arrowsmith v. Voorhies, 55 F.2d 310 (E. D. Mich. 1931). Cf. People v. Com-
pagnie G-6nrale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1882) (state alien passenger tax invali-
dated).
123. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Cf. Ex parte Ah Cue, 101 Cal. 197, 35
Pac. 556 (1894) (state alien exclusion and registration act held invalid).
124. See Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 149-
51 (1909). See also RorvsCHAEMz, CONSTITUTIOiTAL LAW 376 (1939).
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liberties are involved, however, the Court might well extend the doctrine to
discriminatory land legislation, which precludes resident Japanese aliens from
so much as working or living on a farm. Such a prohibition, by denying Japa-
nese farmers opportunity to earn their living, is, in effect, to exclude them
from the state.' This no state can do, once the federal government has
admitted them to the country.
Conflict With the Treaty Power. Equally explicit in the terms of the land
laws is the inapplicability of all prohibitions where an existing treaty declares
otherwise. 2 6 Even though such deference were not set out, the state statute
would yield to provisions of the treaty.12 7 Under the guaranties of the treaty
of 1911,128 for example, state legislation subjecting Japanese aliens to certain
disabilities has been invalidated by the courts.120 Moreover, terms of a treaty,
once incorporated into municipal legislation, are said to endure even though
the treaty itself has been abrogated.' 30I Though technically less controlling, congressional-executive or presidential
agreements, in the light of historical analysis, have been accorded effect equal
to that of treaties as the "supreme law of the land."' 31 It is not inconceivable
that the President may make an agreement with the mother country permit-
125. To prevent the ineligible alien from engaging in agriculture in any way, shape, or
fashion, which the recent California amendments seek to do, would seem a denial of en-
trance indistinguishable from that achieved by a fiat prohibition against working as an
employee. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) ; Ex porte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp.
941, 943 (D. Mass. 1944). See also KoNvrrz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 169.
126. CAL. Gmq. LAws, Act 261, § 2 (Deering 1944) ; Oam. Com.p. LAws Am . § 61-102
(1940); WAsH. REV. STAT. § 10581 (b) (Remington, 1933).
127. "It is the declared will of the people of United States, that every treaty made by
the authority of the United States, shall be superior to the constitution and laws of any
individual state; .. ." Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dal. 199, 237 (U.S. 1794); accord: Chime v.
Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (U.S. 1817); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (18SO); Geo-
froy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) ; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) ; Asakura
v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
128. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and Japan, 37
STAT. 1504 (1911). Though guaranteeing nationals of the contracting parties the right to
"carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories,
warehouses and shops, ... to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, ....
the treaty did not provide for the reciprocal right to own agricultural land. Ibid., Art. I;
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 222 (1923).
129. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (right to run a barber-shop) ; In re
Naka's License, 9 Alaska 1 (D. Alaska 1934) (right to purchase liquor license).
130. In Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 76 Adv. Cal. App. 26, 172 P.2d 103 (1946), the
court held that, even though the war with Japan had abrogated the treaty, the provisions of
the treaty permitting leasing of non-agricultural land to ineligible aliens had become a part
of the local law. See also Magnani v. Hartnett,. 257 App. Div. 487, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 107
(1939) aff'd 282 N.Y. 619, 25 N.E.2d 395 (1940) (provisions of the Jay Treaty of 1790
still in force).
131. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-2 (1937) (presidential compact
to be given equal effect to a treaty with respect to conflicting state lawi) ; United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942) (presidential agreement wNith Russia took precedence
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ting reciprocal ownership of land. Such an agreement would override any
alien land laws then existing.
The status of the alien under pre-UN international law was only that
guaranteed by the amorphous "minimum standards,' 2 which conventionally
were said not to include the right to acquire real property.183 But this situa-
tion no longer obtains. By the United Nations Charter, signatory nations
have resolved to combine their efforts to promote social progress and better
standards of life, to practice tolerance, and to live together in peace. 18" Article
55c, more specifically, requires the fostering of:
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion."' '
Article 56 continues with the following implementing provision:
"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55."113
With declaration of policy in language so unambiguous it is at least probable
that this document-having the force of a treaty-may be incorporated into
the body of American municipal law.137 "Joint and separate action" consist-
ent with these purposes would certainly demand invalidation or repeal of the
alien land laws. Whether the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 are limited by
Article 2 (7), prohibiting intervention in matters essentially "within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state," is subject to controversy. There is at
least scholarly authority, however, for the proposition that they are not.18
over New York state law). See generally McDougal and Lans, Treaties atd Congres-
sional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National
Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 and 534 (1945) ; see also Jessup, The Litvinoff Assignment and
the Belnont Case, 31 Am. J. INT. L. 481 (1937).
132. GIBSON, op. cit. mupra note 2 at 61, 154. See, generally, Borchard, The "Mininm
Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 Micu. L. REv. 445 (1940).
133. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUS-
TIcE 512 (1938). Authorities cited Id. at 513 n. 1.
134. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Preamble (1945). See also Final Act, Inter-
American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Resol. xli, Reprinted in Report of
the U.S. Delegation (recommending that the American Republics ". .. make every effort
to prevent ... all acts which may provoke discrimination among individuals because of
race or religion.")
135. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 55(c) (1945). See also Id., Art. 1(3).
136. Id., Art. 56.
137. Such a probability is not without judicial precedent. In Re Drummond Wren,
[1945] O.R. 778, a Canadian court held a restrictive covenant against Jews void as against
public policy, relying in part on the declarations of the Charter to which Canada was a
signatory. Id. at 781.
138. See Kelsen, Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations, 55 YALE L. J.
997, 1006-7, 1007 n. 10 (1946). See also Foreword by Douglas, id. at 868.
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CONCLUSION
Time and circumstance have rendered non-existent whatever realities may
have originally justified the alien land laws. Fancied fears of a fecund "yel-
low horde," inordinate anxiety over alien ownership of all farm land, and
chimney-corner whisperings of generic disaffection for the American scheme
have little basis in fact today. At bottom, the land laws are products of a
prejudice abundantly manifest. 39 Preservation of these discriminatory stat-
utes, furthermore, has dangerous overtones: the resident alien is their butt to-
day; the Japanese-American citizen may well be their scapegoat tomorrow.
"It is generally impossible to localize the infection."'' 4 To hope that the
west coast states themselves will undergo a change of front seems mildly
quixotic. National action by either courts or Congress will soon be sought.' 4 '
Appearances indicate that court action will come first. 42
Court determination, however, should neither preclude nor delay congres-
sional activity. The time is auspicious to reassess and reformulate our entire
immigration and naturalization policy. 143 The phrase "free white," adopted
in 1790 for the specific purpose of excluding slaves, 44 still controls our
naturalization standards. The courts have compounded confusion by holding
that "white race" is not to be determined by scientific or ethnic criteria, but by
the inconclusive test of "common understanding."'4 3 A District judge in
139. "It is expected that ultimately there won't be a parcel of Jap-owned real estate in
Los Angeles," Los Angeles Times, Dec. 5, 1943, quoted in McWn.mAs, PanXuDIcE, 139.
In 1944 an attempt was made to submit to popular initiative in California a law prohibit-
ing Japanese aliens from owning any type of property whatsoever, but the provision failed
to get sufficient signatures. New York Times, Sept. 10, 1944, p. 22, coL 1. See generally
Sugihara, I Donft Want to Go Back, 42 CoumoNmVEA 330 (1945) and McWnMI Is,
PsnjuicE; passim.
140. Oppenheimer, The Constitutional Rights of Aliens, 1 BaL. oF RinTs Rm. IO
(1941).
141. See Sugihara supra note 139 at 330. For a discussion of various proposals con-
cerning Federal control of race relations see Collier and Padover, An Ihstiute of Ethnic
Democracy, COMMON GROUND Autumn, 1943 p. 3; Biddle, et al., Arc Race Relations the
Business of the Federal Government, Id. Winter, 1944, p. 3; and Shepard, The Tools for
Ethnic Democracy, Id. Spring, 1944, p. 3.
142. Certiorari has been granted in the Oyama case discussed supra pp. 1018-9. See note
14 supra.
143. See generally, The Recent Congressional Hearings on Immigration and Naturali-
zation Problenms, 3 IMmIG. AND NAT. SEm. Mo. Rnv. 249 (1946).
144. 1 STAT. 103 (1790). See In re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337, 349 (W.D. Tex. 1897);
KOHLER, IMMIGRATION ANm ALxIFNS IN THE UTH) STATES 392-8 (1935) ; McW\VmwAUs,
PRnjumicE 48-9. The term "free white" was omitted from the revised statute of 1875 but
restored immediately thereafter by the Act to Correct Errors and Supply Omissions.
KoHLEP, supra at 394; Wigmore, American Naturalization and the Japanese, 28 AI. L
Rnv. 818 (1894).
145. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209-10, 214-5 (1923) ("free
white person" means "caucasian" only as word is popularly used) ; Ex torte fohriez, 54
F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1944). The first Supreme Court declaration of ineligibility of
Japanese was in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). The courts have found
1947] 1035
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
California once said that "white" meant "Caucasian"' 4 and this was later
embalmed in precedent by Mr. Justice Sutherland. 147 It seems highly desir-
able in the interests of rational government and international comity to aban-
don completely such fugitive standards. 48
It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court, in reconsidering the Pacific Coast
alien land legislation, will not limit itself to striking down scattered sections of
the laws,149 but will invalidate the whole scheme on broad grounds. Within
the last decade the Court has felt constrained to scrutinize all racial laws with
care and to indicate that classification based on race alone is per se a denial of
equal protection.'10  Terrace v. Thompson should prove no stumbling block,
for changing conditions can invalidate legislation once held valid.'" The
Chinese may own land as of 1943; the Filipinos and East Indians since 1946;
the resident Japanese alien alone is the object of the discrimination. No mat-
ter how colorable the alleged intent-framed in the language of control over
"property"--the alien land laws are legislation of racism 1 2 which the court
can little afford to sanction.
themselves in inextricable confusion when forced to determine eligibility of aliens of the
half blood. See In re Knight, 171 Fed. 299 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (Father, English; mother,
half Japanese and half Chinese-ineligible) ; In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1938)
("African descent" means an "affirmative quantity" of African blood) ; see generally Mc-
Govney, Naturalization of the Mixed-Blood--A Dictum, 22 CALr. L. REv. 377 (1934);
KoHLua, op. cit. sipra note 144 at 399-405.
146. Judge Sawyer in It re Ah Yup, 1 Fed. Cas. 223, No. 104 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878).
147. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922) ; United States v. Bhagat Singh
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214-5 (1923).
148. See Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 943 (D. Mass. 1944); it' re Mudarri,
176 Fed. 465, 467 (C.C.D. Mass. 1910) ; McWILLIAIMs, PREJUDicE 290-1.
149. Certainly the recent sections added to the California and Oregon laws (notes 110,
113 .vpra) would seem invalid. Similarly, the Court could find that the effect of the laws
as applied to citizens, as in the Oyanza case supra, may be a denial of privileges and im-
munities. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 8-17, Oyama v. California, 15 U.S.L.
WEEK 3376 (April 7, 1947). To invalidate only the most offensive sections, however,
would leave the essential structure of the legislation still intact.
150. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never
can.") ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (194G).
151. See Nashville, C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) ; Chastle-
ton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondu-
rant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921).
152. See Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 242 (1944).
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